By Dr. Jarrett Leplin (auth.)
This publication proposes an unique concept of epistemic justification that gives a brand new strategy to relate justification to the epistemic target of truth-conducive trust. the idea is predicated on a unique research of trustworthy belief-formation that solutions vintage objections to reliability theories in epistemology. The research generates a fashion of distinguishing justified trust from believing justifiedly, such that inerrant belief-formation don't need to be justificatory while systemic deception might be. It thereby respects the instinct that criteria for justification needs to be obtainable to the believer, whereas protecting the fundamental connection of justification to truth.
The research indicates how justification pertains to, yet is exact from, proof, rationality, and likelihood. It presents a unifying remedy of matters valuable to present debate in epistemology, together with epistemic paradoxes, epistemic closure, skepticism, contextualism, advantage theories, the impact of success on wisdom and justification, the translation of subjunctive stipulations for justification, the clash among internalism and externalism, and metaphilosophical overview of epistemological theories. There are additional purposes to metaphysics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of technological know-how, and ethics.
The ebook will have interaction philosophers operating in epistemology or comparable fields, and their graduate students.
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Extra resources for A Theory of Epistemic Justification
The structure of one’s defense places the satisfaction of one’s internalized standards in the premise position, and places truth in the conclusion. From the fulfillment of epistemic duty, one argues for truth. This generates a notion of justification that is internalist in that its implementation in argument does not depend on a connection to truth having actually being effected. The premise need not be true. This notion may be compared to the notion of explanation credited to scientific theories independently of their espousal.
The truth-conduciveness of believing, whatever the truth-value of one’s belief, does not justify the belief; justification is to be bestowed, if at all, on the beliefs that truth-conducive believing induces. Consider a scenario in which P is true and one has strong indication of P’s truth, but the effect of believing P is deleterious with respect to the epistemic goal. Maybe believing P fuses synapses in the brain, or even (Conee, 1992) triggers an explosion that puts one out of the epistemic enterprise permanently.
The best I can do to accommodate this intuition is to pronounce one’s reliance upon it mistaken. One may, if one wishes, judge the thermometer itself unreliable at > +50◦ C. But I find it convenient to abbreviate the reliability of the method of consulting an instrument by the reliability of the instrument. Note further that reliability, as subjunctively defined, carries counterfactual consequences. To establish that a method is reliable, it is insufficient to verify its actual results within its range of normalcy.